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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the political influence of the European Union (EU) on the Russo-
Georgian conflict in August 2008 by systematically categorising all cases of European 
foreign policy (EFP) action in this context according to their impact. Based on a 
modified version of Roy Ginsberg’s framework for measuring political impact, the 
paper explicitly uses an ‘outside-in’ perspective, i.e. it focuses on how third countries 
perceive and experience European foreign policy actions. To what extent and how 
did the EU have a political impact on the conflicting parties during the 2008 war in 
Georgia? The research finds that in fifty percent of all cases European foreign policy 
had a considerable or significant impact on both Georgia and Russia, whereas in the 
other half, the impact was only marginal or even nil. Most importantly, the EU exerted 
this impact without the use of any kind of coercive means or the threat thereof – let 
alone military measures. European foreign policy often successfully relied on 
diplomatic means, persuasion through negotiations, declarations and financial 
incentives. The results challenge traditional thinking, according to which more 
foreign policy capabilities – military in particular – are a necessary precondition in 
order for the EU to become a credible player in world politics. 
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“The problem of Georgia is not just Georgia’s problem. Willingly or unwillingly 
 this is also a European problem. Europe, together with the US, needs to cooperate 
 in order to confront this issue and assure peace and stability for Georgia.”1 
Giorgi Baramidze, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister 
 
1.  Introduction: An Effective EU Foreign Policy? 
After several months of rising tensions between the Republic of Georgia, its two 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the Russian Federation, a 
fully-fledged war broke out on the night of 7 August 2008. The EU and its member 
states tried to influence the conflict via several initiatives, including the conclusion of 
a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), Georgia’s inclusion in the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the development of comprehensive peace 
plans. The military clash, although relatively small and short, had a “shocking effect 
and caused surprise for most commentators and politicians, since military conflict 
between sovereign states in Europe had been perceived as a thing of the past”.2 It 
was the first war in Europe in the 21st century. Many experts had not expected war to 
break out after the NATO Bucharest Summit of April 2008, which was originally meant 
to bring Georgia and Ukraine closer to the West.3 In reaction, the EU stood up and 
intervened both in Tbilisi and Moscow. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who held 
the EU Presidency in the second half of 2008, visited Russia and Georgia several 
times, and many French and EU representatives were flanking his initiative. Only five 
days after the outbreak of the hostilities Sarkozy was able to announce the 
conclusion of a ceasefire agreement on 12 August 2008, which eventually led to the 
retreat of Russian troops. 
It seems that the EU had notable political influence on the tide of events during 
and after the crisis in Georgia. But given Russia’s political leverage and a possible 
convergence of European and Russian interests, there are also critical voices asking 
to what extent the EU was really able to achieve something significant.4 It is a reality 
                                                 
1   G. Gotev, “Georgia Minister: Russia Could Be a Good Neighbour”, interview with Giorgi 
Baramidze, Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia, EurActiv.com, Brussels, 3 December 2009. 
2  P. Joenniemi, “The Georgian-Russian Conflict: a Turning-point?”, DIIS Working Paper, no. 2, 
Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010, p. 25. 
3  Right before the Summit, a US scholar even argued that offering access for Georgia and 
Ukraine to the Membership Action Plan “may, ultimately, set the stage for closer relations 
with Russia” by bringing them under NATO’s security umbrella and thus encouraging 
further disarmament. B. Jackson, “NATO Expansion and Modern Europe”, in R. Shepherd 
(ed.), The Bucharest Conference Papers, Washington, DC, The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, 2008, p. 27. 
4  W. Stützle, “Man kann hier überhaupt nicht von Sieger sprechen. Walther Stützle über die 
Konsequenzen aus dem Georgien-Krieg”, interview in Deutschlandfunk, 13 August 2008. 
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that throughout the period of conflict there were numerous European foreign policy 
actions, including visits by politicians, extensive peace talks, political pressure, the 
threat of sanctions and the offer to become engaged on the ground. This raises the 
question of how much political influence the EU actually had and by what means 
this influence had been exerted. Knowledge about the extent and effectiveness of 
the EU’s foreign policy impact is pivotal in order to identify strengths and weaknesses 
of its general foreign policy performance. Studying EFP is particularly challenging 
because of its uniqueness when compared to the classical foreign policy of nation-
states. The latter is mostly based on “realpolitik and balance of power politics”5 and 
in such a game the EU is likely to get the short end of the stick. The Union is put at a 
structural disadvantage whenever an analysis of its foreign policy is based on 
traditional nation-state capabilities (such as military strength and other coercive 
policies), and yet that is the methodology many studies employ.6 
This paper therefore suggests it is most appropriate to evaluate EFP’s success 
from an outsider’s perspective, rather than analysing the efficiency of internal policy 
making procedures, because it is crucial to go beyond understanding the Union’s 
capabilities or output (which is sui generis and often different from those of nation-
states) and to scrutinise to what extent EFP is actually able to shape the actions of 
third countries. Taking the Georgian war of 2008 as an example, the paper assesses 
to what extent and by what means the EU has been able to effectively influence the 
behaviour, policies or interests of Georgia and Russia.7 The study explicitly takes an 
outside-in approach and intends not to merely analyse foreign policy output that the 
EU might produce (such as declarations, condemnations or meetings), but to 
measure real outcome. For this purpose, it uses a simplified version of a framework by 
Roy Ginsberg, which helps to operationalise the measurement of EFP effectiveness.8 
When measuring political impact, the researcher has to deal with several problems 
inherent to the analysis of qualitative data. Issues that will first need to be addressed 
                                                 
5 R.  Ginsberg,  The European Union in International Politics, Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 
2001, p. 5. 
6  See for example D. Mahncke, A. Ambos & C. Reynolds (eds.), European Foreign Policy: 
From Rhetoric to Reality?, Brussels, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2004; R. Yakemtchouk, La politique 
étrangère de l’Union européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005; M. Jopp & P. Schlotter (eds.), 
Kollektive Außenpolitik: Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2007. 
7  Strictly speaking, there have been four conflicting parties: Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. However, given the high level of dependence of the two regions from 
Russia and their inability to lead or influence a war such as the one of 2008, it seems 
reasonable to focus our analysis on the EU’s political impact on Russia and Georgia. 
8 Ginsberg,  op.cit. 
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include the definition of thresholds and terms as well as the problem of reliability and 
validity. Second, we will discuss eight examples of European foreign policy actions, a 
selection which aims to represent all 16 EFP cases that have been identified within 
the relevant time frame.9 They will be categorised according to the framework in 
order to determine the extent to which the EU’s foreign policy output had an impact 
on the conflicting parties. Third, the conclusions will be presented together with a 
brief assessment of the performance of Ginsberg’s framework and its ability to 
address the afore-mentioned problems. 
 
2.  Outputs and Outcomes: Measuring Political Impact 
2.1  Introducing the Analytical Framework 
 
For this analysis the term ‘EFP action’ will be rather broadly defined: it is assumed that 
the EU (be it the Council, the Commission or the Parliament) rarely has an influence 
alone. Given the large number of more or less official actors within the EU system it is 
understood that all of them can at times act on behalf of the Union and/or have an 
impact on its international standing as a whole. Therefore, when talking about EFP 
action, this paper explicitly includes all actions by the institutions, the member states 
and any officials acting on their behalf. We will call these actions the foreign policy 
output of the EU. 
An EFP output only results in an external political impact if it affects a third 
country such that “nonmembers modify or change the direction or substance of a 
domestic or foreign policy that would not likely have occurred in the absence of EU 
stimulus or EU stimulus accompanied by stimuli from other international actors”, or 
that “nonmembers’ interests are beneficially or adversely affected by EFP action”.10 
Moreover, it is important to note that the notion of external political impact within our 
framework does not carry much of a judgement, i.e. it does not equate foreign 
policy impact with foreign policy success.11 Although a successful foreign policy may 
be an indicator for prior political impact, the failure of achieving a foreign policy 
goal is not considered a proof that there had been no impact. Our aim here is to 
analyse the EU’s political impact, not its performance in freeing Georgia from Russian 
occupation or reuniting it with its breakaway regions. 
                                                 
9  The complete list of EFP actions is presented in the annex of this paper. 
10 Ginsberg, op.cit., p. 49. 
11 Ibid., p. 273. 
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To structure this scrutiny, our framework provides a four-category system in order 
to determine the effectiveness of EFP impact and allows us to classify each single 
foreign policy action accordingly. However, each categorisation of qualitative data 
risks being a highly subjective exercise. To make the division conclusive, it is essential 
(1) to carefully define the thresholds between the four categories and (2) to 
thoroughly collect, review and judge the facts that will corroborate the 
categorisation. The following definitions include an explanatory example for each 
category taken from Ginsberg’s own case studies.12 
a.  A foreign policy action has nil political influence when it “does not result in 
political impact or [aims] to have political impact but does not succeed […]. With 
nil political impact, the EU has no influence on nonmembers and their interests”. 
This category is relatively simple to determine because either the EU has some 
impact or it has not. No further delimitation has to be done. Example: In 1997, the 
EU proposed a code of conduct between the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) and 
Israel in order to improve their relations. The proposal “languishes due to lack of 
consensus”. 
b.  EFP actions have marginal political impact when they influence a nonmember’s 
policies or interests generally or indirectly, but still without effecting an actual 
change or modification in behaviour. The influence can be either beneficial or 
adverse. Example: In 1998, the EU protested Israel’s settlements by sending its 
Presidency to Har Homa, a settlement outside the internationally recognised 
borders of Israel. The EU “angers [and] isolates Israel, which views [the] visit as 
unacceptable”. The Israeli reaction shows that their interests have been affected 
by the EU’s condemnation and visit, but there is no proof that the EU has caused 
changes in Israel’s behaviour or policies, such as stopping (or intensifying) the 
settlements or coming back to the negotiation table. 
c.  The EU has considerable political impact when its actions “tangibly influence the 
domestic, foreign and/or security policy, interests or behaviour of a nonmember”. 
Considerable impact requires “major beneficial or adverse political impact on 
interests and may effect a change or modification in the behaviour or domestic, 
foreign and/or security policy of a nonmember”. To find the threshold between 
marginal and considerable impact is a particularly tricky endeavour. The 
                                                 
12  For the following quotations see ibid., pp. 52-54. Examples from Ginsberg’s annex, table 
5.1 (no page numbers available). 
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difference lies both in the word ‘tangible’ and in the fact that considerable 
impact requires a ‘major’ influence (as compared to a general or indirect one) 
and may induce actual policy changes. Example: In 1999, the EU supported 
accountability reforms within the P.A. by co-financing a Task Force, which came 
up with recommendations and assisted its implementation. Many of the 
recommendations have been implemented. This instance demonstrates not a 
merely general influence on interests, but a real policy modification towards more 
financial transparency and accountability that has been caused by EU support. 
d.  Lastly, EFP actions have significant political impact when they are “primarily and 
directly responsible for a change or modification in the behaviour or domestic, 
foreign and/or security policy of a nonmember”. Additionally, the EU’s impact 
must “affect vital interests” and must be exerted alone or in a group of two or 
three other international actors. The conditions for EFP to have significant impact 
are thus observably higher than those for considerable impact. Example: In 1999, 
the EU stated its “willingness to consider Palestinian statehood at later date if [an 
own] declaration [of statehood] is postponed until after Israeli election”. As a 
result, the P.A. indeed postponed this declaration, allowing Arafat to quit without 
losing face and the EU to prevent a deterioration of the crisis. Thus, the EU has 
been primarily and directly responsible for a policy change that can be 
considered to be of vital interest and a major security concern to the P.A. 
 
It is important to note that even after a careful definition of the categories, in some 
cases there will be room for ambiguity and some categorisations may rely on 
subjective judgements. The primary results of the analysis are summarised in the table 
reproduced in the appendix.13 It identifies 16 instances of EFP actions from the 
beginning of the 1990s until February 2009, which have had – or were supposed to 
have – an influence on the 2008 war in Georgia. The actual outcome or result of 
each EFP action is listed in the table’s fifth column, followed by the assigned level of 
political impact (nil, marginal, considerable or significant). The table gives a 
                                                 
13   J. Weisensee, “Measuring European Foreign Policy Impact: The EU and the Georgia Crisis 
of 2008”, Master’s Thesis, Bruges, College of Europe 2010 (unpublished). 
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comprehensive overview of the research results.14 The text will regularly refer to the 
various actions via the numbering in the very first column. In order to get a more 
chronological overview of the course of events and EFP actions, the reader may 
prefer to have a closer look at the table before reading the analysis itself. 
 
2.2  Challenges for the Research Design 
 
Obviously, the most difficult part of the argumentation is to identify a link between 
output and outcome. While demonstrating correlations between political actions 
and events on the ground seems to be a relatively easy task to do, proving a causal 
relationship is a much more problematic exercise. In the simplest case, one can rely 
on public declarations and statements of interests. If on day 1, for instance, country B 
openly rejects cooperation with country A, on day 2 country A pressures country B for 
cooperation, and on day 3 country B suddenly changes its mind on the issue, 
political impact of country A can easily be claimed. Unfortunately, in reality most 
cases are not this unambiguous. Interests are often unclear and the timing is more 
complicated. Moreover, in the real world there are more actors than just country A 
and B. Given the high number and the often overlapping activities of international 
actors, including nation-states, international organisations and informal groupings like 
the G20, it is sometimes difficult to credit one outcome to one particular actor. 
Ginsberg argues that the picture also risks being distorted because EU member states 
tend to claim political success as their own, even when they acted through an EU 
framework, whereas “the EU itself does not promote its accomplishments”.15  
For example, it is possible for a country to claim a foreign policy success which it 
would not have achieved without its position within or the backing from the EU and 
its other members. Equally, the EU may be successful in a case only thanks to the 
capabilities of one or two particular member states. In this analysis it is therefore 
assumed that the EU can exert its impact in cooperation or even in unintended 
interplay with other actors without downgrading the effectiveness of its own 
                                                 
14  This table is a simplified version of Ginsberg’s original framework for two reasons: First, 
Ginsberg also collects information about the type of measure (cognitive or empirical) 
that he uses for the categorisation of EFP actions. However, the concept of these types of 
measure is difficult to apply consistently because it remains somewhat unclear whether 
they actually describe the type of measure the researcher used or the type of impact the 
EU had. Ibid., pp. 51-52. Second, the framework also allows to analyse the EU’s impact on 
third actors who are not directly parties to the conflict. This ‘relative impact’, although 
probably existent in the case of Georgia (e.g., the US, the UN, NATO, etc.), lies beyond 
the scope of our analysis. 
15 Ibid., p. 33. 
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influence, and foreign policy actions of EU member states that are pursuing a 
declared Union goal are treated as genuine EFP actions.16 For instance, although 
Sarkozy personally assumed an overwhelming role during most of the negotiation 
process that aimed to cease the Russo-Georgian hostilities, it is consistent to credit his 
achievements to the EU, which he was representing. Indeed, Russian officials and 
politicians seem to have been quite impressed by the French President’s 
performance and perceived him as a true EU representative.17 Or as Dominic Fean 
has put it: “En profitant de la présidence européenne, Nicolas Sarkozy a mis tout le 
poids de l’UE, de son pays et de sa propre personne dans la balance pour peser lors 
des pourparlers.”18 Therefore, the Union and its members make a good team and it 
seems impossible to disaggregate their influence. 
 
3.  The Political Impact of the EU on the War in Georgia 
 
The following eight examples of EFP action aim to demonstrate how the analysis has 
been conducted in order to answer the question to what extent and by what means 
the EU had political impact during the 2008 war in Georgia. The cases are presented 
in sub-chapters reflecting their classification in the four categories in order to 
facilitate comparison and to increase plausibility. Within the sub-chapters they are 
presented chronologically. Each case has a number indicating its position within the 
annexed table. 
 
3.1 Nil  Political  Impact 
 
Case 10: In an attempt to push Russia for a withdrawal of troops, the EU Presidency 
announced on 1 September 2008 that “until troops have withdrawn to the positions 
held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement will 
be postponed”.19 The re-establishment of the situation prior to the outbreak of 
                                                 
16  According to Ginsberg, the EU can have political impact “acting alone or as one of 
several actors”, see explanations above. Ibid., p. 53. The only limitation envisaged is for 
the strongest category: “The EU has significant political impact – acting alone or as one 
of two or three other actors”. Ibid., p. 54. 
17  Interview with Timofei Bordachev, Director, Center for Comprehensive European and 
International Studies, State University – Higher School of Economics (HSE), Brussels, 25 
March 2010. 
18  D. Fean, “Du bon usage de l’UE en Géorgie : ‘Partenariat oriental’ et gestion des conflits”, 
Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 44, Paris, Institut français des relations internationales, September 
2009, p. 5. 
19  Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 12594/2/08 REV 2, 1 September 
2008. 
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hostilities is a central requirement of the six-point agreement. In a much-cited 
statement, Nicolas Sarkozy clarified:  
“Le 15 octobre, il ne doit plus y avoir un seul soldat russe qui soit 
sur des positions qui n’étaient pas celles où il se trouvait avant 
le 7 août. C’est clair et c’est simple. Soit c’est fait et, dans ce 
cas-là, chacun a respecté sa parole, soit ce n’est pas fait et 
alors, cinq jours plus tard, l’Europe en tirera les 
conséquences.”20  
Russia for its part argued it was allowed to take additional security measures “dans 
l’attente d’un mécanisme international”, as stipulated by the agreement.21 
However, by reading the fifth point of the agreement carefully, it becomes clear that 
this exception is only meant for the Russian peacekeeping force (i.e. about 500 
soldiers under UN mandate): “les forces de paix russes mettront en œuvre des 
mesures additionnelles de sécurité”, whereas “les forces militaires russes devront se 
retirer sur les lignes antérieurs au déclenchement des hostilités” [emphases added]. 
By early October, almost all Russian troops had indeed left Georgia proper.22 Within 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, the armed forces had undergone a strong 
build-up and eventually numbered 7,600.23 Through the suspension of the PCA 
negotiations the EU failed to convince Russia to comply with the six-point agreement, 
and in November 2008 the Council decided to resume the negotiations despite 
Russia’s continued non-compliance.24 In addition to this consistency problem, it has 
been argued that Europe, by resuming the negotiations, wasted one of its strongest 
(perhaps its only) trump card to pressure Russia to comply with all six points.25 
                                                 
20  Joint Press Conference of Nicolas Sarkozy and Mikheil Saakashvili, Tbilisi, 8 September 
2008. 
21  The six-point agreement reads: “1/ Ne pas recourir à la force. 2/ Cesser les hostilités de 
façon définitive. 3/ Donner libre accès à l’aide humanitaire. 4/ Les forces militaires 
géorgiennes devront se retirer dans leurs lieux habituels de cantonnement. 5/ Les forces 
militaires russes devront se retirer sur leurs lignes antérieurs au déclenchement des 
hostilités. Dans l’attente d’un mécanisme international, les forces de paix russes mettront 
en œuvre des mesures additionnelles de sécurités. 6/ Ouverture de discussions 
internationales sur les modalités de sécurité et de stabilité en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du 
Sud.” A copy of the original agreement can be found at http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/ 
Six_Point_Peace_Plan.pdf. 
22  In the following, the term ‘Georgia proper’ will be used for the Georgian territory 
excluding South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
23  “Georgia Confirms Russian Pullout”, The New York Times, 8 October 2008. 
24 R.  Asmus,  A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, 
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 213.  
25  S. Fischer, “European Policy towards the South Caucasus after the Georgia Crisis”, 
Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 1, Zurich, Russian and Eurasian Security Network, 17 
December 2008, p. 5. 
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Although the very brief and then unconditionally lifted suspension of PCA 
negotiations might have had a positive influence on EU-Russia relations, it had nil 
political impact on the conflicting parties. 
                                                
Case 12: Fully consistent with the EU’s position on Georgia’s territorial integrity, 
on 8 September 2008 the French President made clear that the Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM), which the EU agreed to deploy, would operate in the whole of Georgia, 
including South Ossetia and Abkhazia.26 This is also reflected in the Joint Action of the 
Council establishing EUMM, which stipulates that the mission shall fulfil its mandate 
“throughout Georgia”.27 However, the Russian interpretation of this notion is different, 
arguing that with the formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia the situation 
has changed fundamentally: “From a legal point of view […] new states have come 
into existence now”,28 and therefore, Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not be 
considered part of Georgia in the sense of the ceasefire agreement. Sarkozy’s 
promise that EUMM would be deployed within the regions is all the more startling as 
the agreement which he achieved with President Medvedev earlier the same day (8 
September) reads the contrary: “Les préparatifs seront accélérés pour permettre le 
déploiement d’observateurs supplémentaires [européennes] dans les zones 
adjacentes à l’Ossétie du Sud et à l’Abkhazie”.29 Principally in line with this wording 
(but less restrictive), the website of the French President explains: “Les nouveaux 
observateurs de l’UE seront, eux, déployés en priorité dans les zones adjacentes à 
l’Abkhazie et à l’Ossétie du Sud” [emphasis added].30 It seems clear that Sarkozy 
had no choice but to accept Russia’s firm position on the matter. “The Russians have 
consistently said that the EU will never ever monitor inside these areas [of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia]. They have never given it the slightest chance.”31 It seems 
that from the beginning EUMM had two mandates, one agreed in Moscow and one 
 
26  “Je dois préciser […] : les observateurs internationaux ne sont pas limités à la délimitation 
administrative de l’Ossétie et de l’Abkhazie mais pourront pénétrer à l’intérieur”. Joint 
Press Conference of Nicolas Sarkozy and Mikheil Saakashvili, op.cit. 
27  European Union, “Council Joint Action on the European Union Monitoring Mission in 
Georgia, EUMM Georgia”, Official Journal of the European Union, 2008/736/CFSP, 15 
September 2008, art. 2. 
28  Kremlin, “Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, 
Rossia, NTV”, 31 August 2008. 
29  “Mise en œuvre du Plan du 12 août 2008”, 8 September 2008 Agreement. 
30  Présidence de la République, “Pour résoudre le conflit, la France et l’Europe en première 
ligne”, 31 March 2010, p. 3. 
31  Phone interview with Janne Taalas, Director of Policy Planning and Research, Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2010. Also see R. Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s 
Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 6, 2008, p. 
1159. 
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agreed in Brussels – and they were not the same.32 To date, EUMM staff have never 
been permitted to monitor the two regions, and it is clear that Europe will not be 
able to change this status quo against Moscow’s will’.33 The EU therefore had nil 
impact on Russia’s decision to prevent its mission from monitoring the breakaway 
regions. 
 
3.2  Marginal Political Impact 
 
Case 1: Throughout the 1990s the EU tried to have a stabilising impact in the Southern 
Caucasus, first through its Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Georgia 
and later by the appointment of a Special Representative and the inclusion of the 
region in the newly created European Neighbourhood Policy. Most measures were 
aimed at supporting economic development, stability and reform, targets to which 
the EU dedicated impressive amounts of money.34 The only element of political 
engagement was the appointment of Heikki Talvitie as the first EU Special Represen-
tative for the Southern Caucasus directly after the Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003. 
The Special Representative was the pivotal EU figure responsible for dealing with all 
parties involved, including the de facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
However, in an interview, Talvitie underlined that his influence in Tbilisi had been 
inversely proportional to that in Tskhinvali.35 Generally sceptical of Saakashvili’s 
policies, his relations with the Georgian President deteriorated to the extent in which 
he became active with the South Ossetians. With respect to Abkhazia, at that time 
the EU’s stand was even more limited: “Quite frankly I let Abkhazia to Heidi 
[Tagliavini]...”.36 
                                                 
32  One could blame Sarkozy of untruthfulness. However, the former EU Special 
Representative for the Southern Caucasus suggests, that Sarkozy just did not get the 
geopolitical situation straight: The South Ossetian borders were not as clear during the 
conflict as they are today, and in his mind, the zones adjacent to South Ossetia could 
well have included the parts of the region over which Tbilisi held control before the war. 
Phone interview with Heikki Talvitie, Former EU Special Representative for the Southern 
Caucasus and Member of the Finnish OSCE Chairmanship Team 2008, 27 April 2010. 
33  Javier Solana admitted that there are “no military or diplomatic tools to force the 
Russians out of the enclaves”. Cited in M. Frichova, “Georgia After the August War: 
Implications for EU Engagement”, Briefing Paper, Policy Department External Policies of 
the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008, p. 7. 
34  For years, “the EU has primarily been an aid provider rather than a political actor”, and in 
2008, the EU also was by far the biggest donor in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
International Crisis Group, “Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role”, 
Europe Report, Brussels, no. 173, 20 March 2006, p. 5. 
35  Phone interview with Heikki Talvitie, op.cit. 
36 Ibid.  Heidi Tagliavini was Head of UNOMIG, the UN Observer Mission in Abkhazia, from 
2002 to 2006. 
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While focussing mainly on the economic aspects of stabilisation and conflict 
resolution, Europe did not respond to any hard security demands whatsoever, thus 
creating an increasing level of frustration among Georgian officials and politicians 
who considered the EU’s approach to be “outdated”.37 In addition, there seems to 
be no comprehensive impact assessment of the EU’s activities in this field and it 
remains unclear to what extent Georgia’s economic development might have had 
an impact on the course of the conflict itself. One observer rightly asked “what is the 
European Union’s few million [worth] when Russia is promising the Ossetians a 
future?”38 What is clear is that the EU’s focus on economic assistance as well as its 
refusal to be more engaged in terms of security allowed other actors, such as Russia, 
to fill this gap in the breakaway regions. By influencing the Georgian reform agenda 
and probably strengthening the country’s European aspirations, the impact of EU 
programmes on the conflict can at most be considered to be marginal, i.e. a 
general or indirect impact on Georgia’s interests without effecting an actual change 
in its behaviour. 
Case 13: As foreseen by the six-point and the 8 September agreements, the EU, 
OSCE and UN were aiming to avoid another freeze in the conflict by pushing to 
launch the so-called ‘Geneva talks’. Between 15 October 2008 and 30 March 2010 
there had been ten rounds of discussions, involving the three chairing organisations 
plus Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and US representatives. One of the 
most important outputs of the Geneva meetings is the Incident Prevention and 
Response Mechanism (IPRM), which has established a basis for regular meetings both 
between Georgian and Abkhaz and between Georgian and South Ossetian 
representatives. These meetings aim to resolve practical administrative issues on the 
ground, such as the release of detainees and border incidents between citizens or 
police forces, but at least with respect to South Ossetia, there have been numerous 
disappointments.39 The Ossetian representatives still only agree to meet at the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b o r d e r  l i n e  ( a  p l a c e  t h a t  b a s i c a l l y  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  m u d d y  f i e l d ) ,  a n d  
besides the agreement to set up a tent and to install a fuel-driven heater, not much 
has been achieved so far.40 In October 2009, South Ossetia announced its with-
drawal from the mechanism for ‘organisational reasons’, expecting Georgia to 
                                                 
37  International Crisis Group, op.cit., pp. 6-7. 
38 Ibid., p. 21. 
39  See for example European Monitoring Mission in Georgia, “EUMM Disappointed that 
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism Meeting Will not Take Place”, 20 June 
2009. 
40  Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 31 March 2010. 
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recognise its independence before cooperation can take place.41 In contrast, the 
Abkhaz authorities permit meetings to take place in the clearly more conducive 
atmosphere of a former UN building. After the recent meeting in Sukhumi (23 March 
2010) all sides welcomed “ways to co-operate and exchange information on the 
fight against criminal activities” and – after discussions in a “business-like 
atmosphere” – EUMM invited Abkhaz media to visit their premises and to “see for 
themselves the role and work of the EUMM”.42 Although there has been some 
progress since the launch of the IPRM, it is hardly possible to determine any tangible 
change of policies or behaviour on either side. The fact that the parties do meet at 
all in such a setting – though a noteworthy success – can rather be defined as a 
general influence on interests as long as they do not lead to real political 
commitments. The Geneva talks, of which the IPRM is the most far-reaching output, 
have so far had only a marginal impact on the conflicting parties. They are merely 
important “to keep the issue open”.43 
 
3.3  Considerable Political Impact 
 
Case 7: Right after the outbreak of the war on 7 August 2008, the French President’s 
diplomatic advisers tried to convince their Russian counterparts to halt the advance 
of troops and on 11 August Sarkozy suggested he travel to Moscow in order to 
negotiate with Medvedev directly. “But French national security advisor Jean-David 
Levitte was afraid that, while negotiating a peace deal, Sarkozy could be profoundly 
humiliated by the Russian army having taken Tbilisi and overthrown the Georgian 
government.”44 Therefore, Sarkozy set two conditions before he would agree to 
come to Moscow: first, that there would be a truce in place at the moment of his 
arrival, and second, that Russia would refrain from continuing on to Tbilisi.45 When the 
French President landed in Moscow on the morning of 12 August, both conditions 
were met. This instance shows a significant impact of an EFP action, because the 
French conditions directly led to a truce and the stop of Russia’s army on their way to 
                                                 
41  U. Halbach, “Die Europäische Beobachtungsmission in Georgien: Friedenssicherung auf 
umstrittener Grundlage”, in M. Asseburg & R. Kempin (eds.), Die EU als strategischer 
Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik?, German Institute for International and 
Security Studies (SWP), Berlin, December 2009, p. 133. 
42  European Monitoring Mission in Georgia, “Exchange of Information on Specific Civilian 
Cases, Various Incidents and the Ability to Cross the Inguri River Were Key Points Discussed 
at the Fourteenth IPRM Meeting in Gali”, 26 March 2010. 
43  Interview with Janne Taalas, op.cit. 
44 Asmus,  op.cit., p. 194. 
45 Ibid. 
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t h e  G e o r g i a n  c a p i t a l ,  i . e .  a  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  R u s s i a ’ s  b e h a v i o u r .  I t  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
debatable to what extent this modification did affect ‘vital interests’. Of course, in a 
war situation, most decisions can have an impact on vital interests, but Russia’s 
unilateral stop of hostilities could have been revoked at any time and would not 
necessarily have caused a military disadvantage for its armed forces, which were 
outrunning the Georgian forces both in terms of troops and equipment.46 Moreover, 
the truce was only temporary. Fighting resumed after the negotiations and 
reportedly ended not earlier than 16 August.47 It is thus reasonable to credit only 
considerable political impact to the conditions set by the French President. 
Case 14: In line with its pre-war policy, the EU sought to support economic 
reconstruction in Georgia after the end of hostilities. Georgia had lost much of its 
military capabilities in the battle and claimed overall damage to be around one 
billion euros.48 Additionally, in 2008 Georgia faced a twofold challenge: the war, 
which destroyed infrastructure and investor confidence, and the global financial 
crisis, which put pressure on Georgia’s currency and increased credit prices. As a 
result of both, the country’s economic growth dropped from 9 to 3.5 percent and 
estimations expect an increase in the unemployment rate from 13 to more than 15 
percent. A special World Bank working group proposed “that donors extend fresh 
commitments in the amount of 3.25 billion US dollars over a three year period”.49 
Therefore, the EU together with the World Bank organised an international donors’ 
conference which took place on 22 October 2008 in Brussels. During this conference, 
the two organisations raised 3.4 billion euros for the reconstruction of Georgia, 
including 1.9 billion from non-European donors.50 The funds are destined for the 
resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), economic rehabilitation and 
recovery, macro-financial stabilisation and infrastructure support.51 T o what exten t 
this overwhelming financial support had an impact on the conflict is very difficult to 
measure, but most observers conclude that the international aid pledged in Brussels 
was of great importance for the stabilisation of the Georgian economy.52 Georgian 
                                                 
46  Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, “Report. 
Volume II”, September 2009, pp. 214-217. 
47 Ibid., p. 219. 
48 Ibid., p. 225. 
49  World Bank, “Georgia: Summary of Joint Needs Assessment Findings”, October 2008, p. iii. 
50  European Commission & World Bank, “Georgia Donors’ Conference”, Brussels, 22 
October 2008. 
51  European Union, “EU Assistance Fact Sheet: Georgia”, MEMO/08/645, 22 October 2008. 
52 Frichova,  op.cit., pp. 9-10. “Ce financement est capital pour la poursuite du développe-
ment et du maintien de la stabilité de la Géorgie.” Fean, op.cit., p. 10.  
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officials go even further and underline that Western help was ‘significant’ for 
stabilising the government and preventing social unrest.53 Georgia’s Deputy Prime 
Minister, who assured the money would be used for houses for IDPs as well as larger 
infrastructure projects, emphasised that “[w]ithout the money that arrived from 
Europe, the US and even Japan, […] it would have created internal social strain, 
tensions, turbulences, and Georgia would not have survived in this kind of situation: 
both the government and the people”.54 Through financial assistance, the EU 
therefore succeeded at least in strengthening Georgia’s pre-war reconstruction 
policies, causing a tangible modification of these policies. Considering Georgia’s 
skyrocketing foreign debts (2.3 billion US dollars in 2007 and 3.4 billion in 200855), it 
seems also likely that EU funds not only strengthened Georgia’s reconstruction 
policies, but that they boosted them from a near-to-zero level. In any event, the EU 
had a considerable impact on these post-war Georgian policies. 
Some observers raise another argument with respect to Georgia’s political 
stability: namely that Russia wanted to prevent NATO expansion56 and to topple the 
Georgian government – thus replacing Saakashvili, whom Putin is said to hate 
personally.57 Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze argued that “none of 
the Georgian leaders have ever been acceptable to Russia” and explained that 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  n o t  l e s s  t h a n  f o u r  G e o r g i a n  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  “ k i c k e d  o u t ”  b y  
Moscow.58 Some also see economic reasons for this line of argument, emphasising 
the high number of influential Moscow-based businessmen with Georgian origins, 
who allegedly “favor a future power transfer which would allow a normalization of 
relations – and trade”.59 But perhaps the strongest argument is Condoleezza Rice’s 
claim that in a phone call on 10 August Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
“insisted […] that there was an additional Russian condition for ending the war, 
                                                 
53  E-mail interview with Georgian Senior Official, Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 
2010. 
54 Gotev,  op.cit. 
55  World Bank, “Georgia at a Glance”, 12 September 2009. 
56  See analysis of case 3 below. 
57 Asmus,  op.cit., pp. 108, 159. During his negotiations with Sarkozy, Putin reportedly said “I 
want to hang Saakashvili by the balls”. Ibid., p. 199. 
58 Gotev,  op.cit. 
59 Frichova,  op.cit., p. 9. 
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namely that Mikheil Saakashvili had to go”.60 Unfortunately, Russia never confirmed 
this conversation explicitly. However, asked by his American counterpart during the 
UN Security Council meeting the same day whether Russia’s intentions in Georgia 
were regime change, the Russian ambassador to the UN – somewhat beating 
around the bush – indirectly confirmed that this would be in Russia’s interest.61 If it is 
true that Russia wanted to overthrow Saakashvili, then the political stabilisation of his 
government provided by EFP action would have affected Georgia’s vital interests, 
and could thus be considered a significant impact. However, since such a line of 
reasoning about the EU’s role in saving Saakashvili’s government remains disputed, 
the instance is only coded as a considerable impact. 
 
3.4  Significant Political Impact 
 
Case 3: On 3 April 2008, NATO held its Bucharest Summit, during which it planned to 
express its position on whether Georgia (among others) would be granted access to 
the Membership Action Plan programme (MAP). While most NATO members 
(especially the US and Eastern European states) were strongly supportive of such a 
step, some countries (namely Germany and France) opposed it.62 Officially, they 
were doubtful of the extent to which Georgia was ready for MAP in terms of 
democratisation and military advancement. Taking into account that MAP is a 
programme of “advice, assistance and practical support”, which does not 
“prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership”,63 this official 
standing is hardly convincing.  
                                                 
60  After Lavrov claiming that this was a confidential conversation, according to her own 
statement Rice answered: “The Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign 
Minister of Russia do not have a confidential conversation about the overthrow of a 
democratically elected government. I am about to get on the phone and tell everyone I 
can possibly find that Russia’s war aim is the overthrow of the Georgian government.” 
Cited in Asmus, op.cit., p. 182. 
61  United Nations Security Council, “The Situation in Georgia”, 63rd year, 5953rd meeting, 
S/PV.5953, New York, 10 August 2008. The Russian ambassadors response reads: 
“sometimes there are occasions when certain leaders are elected by their peoples and 
come to power […] and become an obstacle to enabling their own people from 
emerging from a given situation. In such situations, some leaders take courageous 
decisions with regard to their political future. […] But I am encouraged by the fact that 
[US] Ambassador Khalilzad has referred to this publicly; I suggest that this means that he 
finds it an interesting idea and that he is ready to place it before the international 
community for its verdict.” 
62  For a detailed list of events and for the following paragraph see Asmus, op.cit., pp. 111-
140. 
63  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Membership Action Plan (MAP)”, 3 March 2010. 
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MAP offers no guarantee of future membership in NATO, let 
alone in the European Union. To be precise, MAP would initiate 
an open-ended process that anticipates that Georgia and 
Ukraine will spend many years resolving critical national 
questions of stability, territorial integrity, institutional capacity, 
and the resolution of frozen conflicts before making a political 
decision to pursue NATO membership.64 
Instead, it seemed that France and particularly Germany were worried about what 
Russia’s reaction would be. German Chancellor Angela Merkel had “publicly 
registered her opposition to MAP for Georgia – […] in Moscow as well” and she 
disagreed with Bush on “the wisdom of embracing Tbilisi closely and the signal that 
such an embrace would send to the Russians”.65 The fact that Georgia (together 
with Ukraine) was not granted access to MAP in Bucharest is primarily credited to 
Germany. Instead, the compromise reached at the Bucharest Summit reads: “We 
agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO”,66 which is an 
unprecedented formulation granting more than MAP ever would have: a guarantee 
for future membership. 
It is difficult to explain, then, why the countries which most strenuously opposed 
MAP eventually agreed to such a commitment. Asmus’ description of the negotia-
tions suggests that it was the high level of pressure that wore down the heads of 
states and governments when they negotiated between the plenary sessions.67 One 
might also argue that at that moment the Eastern European leaders were simply the 
better negotiators. Rushing out of the negotiation room, NATO’s Assistant Secretary 
General told the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister right after the decision that “there 
was no MAP but […] there was a sentence that might be even worse from the 
Russian perspective”.68 In other words, it was the discord among European NATO 
members that led to a final formulation with far-reaching consequences. Georgia, 
on one hand, was highly disappointed by the declaration because it did not meet 
Tbilisi’s security needs. Saakashvili was convinced that only inclusion in MAP would be 
                                                 
64   Jackson, op.cit., p. 25. 
65 Asmus,  op.cit., pp. 126, 129. Also see “Nato Denies Georgia and Ukraine”, BBC, 3 April 
2008. 
66  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of 
State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, 
Bucharest, 3 April 2008. 
67 Asmus,  op.cit., pp. 131-134. 
68  Even Gordon Brown was confused, reportedly saying to George W. Bush: “I am not sure, 
what we did here. I know that we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just 
make them members of NATO.” Ibid., p. 134. 
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able to deter a supposed Russian aggression, and he believed that it was Angela 
Merkel who had deprived him of it.69 Russian leaders, on the other hand, were 
dismayed by the Summit’s output. As a first step, Putin quickly made clear that “[t]he 
emergence of a powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct threat 
to Russian security”, and “[t]he efficiency of our cooperation will depend on whether 
NATO members take Russia’s interests into account”.70 Only a couple of days later, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it crystal-clear: “We will do everything 
possible to prevent the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO.”71  
Of course, NATO did not cause the war ,  b u t  i t  c a n  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  
Bucharest results “did affect the start of the war”.72 First, by showing its unwillingness 
(or inability) to offer the official MAP status to Georgia, NATO sent “a signal that [it] is 
not going to defend Georgia in case of attack”.73 Second, they demonstrated to 
Russia that if it wanted to prevent Georgia’s NATO accession, it had to react quickly. 
Although probably neither of the two effects was actually intended by European 
leaders, their compromise had a major direct impact on the behaviour and the 
security policies of both conflicting parties. By guaranteeing that Georgia and 
Ukraine would join NATO, Russia’s vital interests were heavily affected. Many believe 
that the only way to prevent the war would have been to stop Georgia’s Western-
oriented policies.74 The Summit’s compromise can be perceived as one of the 
important triggers that eventually led to war. “The Bucharest outcome might not only 
have failed to deter Moscow; it might even have emboldened it.”75 Through its 
disunity, Europe had a significant (although a probably unintended) impact on the 
conflicting parties.  
Case 11: Even after the signing of the six-point agreement, Russia delayed 
beginning troop withdrawals until 22 August 2008. In accordance with point five of 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 141. 
70  Cited in D. Smith, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies before the 
2008 War”, in S. Cornell & S. Starr (eds.), The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, 
New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2009, p. 126. 
71 Cited  in  ibid., p. 127. 
72  E-mail interview with Georgian Senior Official, op.cit. 
73 Ibid. 
74  For example J. Kranz, “Der Kampf um den Frieden und sein besonderer Facilitator: 
Anmerkungen zur Georgienkrise”, Archiv des Völkerrechts, vol. 46, 2008, p. 486. According 
to Georgia’s Deputy Prime Minister, one could even doubt that: “Informally, we [...] told 
Russia that if the price of Georgian freedom, security and independence was NATO 
membership, we were ready to discuss this in a trilateral format with the West, Russia and 
Georgia. Saakashvili proposed this to Putin. And Putin replied: ‘I am not going to 
exchange your territories with your foreign policy’.” Gotev, op.cit. 
75 Asmus,  op.cit., p. 138. 
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the agreement, Russia argued that it needed ‘additional security measures’ until an 
international mechanism would deter Georgia from further ‘aggression’. Its troops 
remained even longer within the so-called buffer zones around South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, a choice which the EU heavily opposed.76 Because of the limited overall 
size of Georgia, the generously defined depth of Russia’s buffer zones virtually cut the 
country in two pieces, with Russian soldiers blocking the main East-West road.77 
During the negotiations of an extended ceasefire agreement on 8 September 2008, 
the EU offered to deploy a monitoring mission (EUMM) in order to replace the Russian 
additional security measures. Sarkozy made clear that “cette fois-ci c’est pour 
annoncer un calendrier de retrait des forces russes sur les lignes d’avant le début des 
hostilités. Il n’y a pas d’ambiguïté : c’est-à-dire les lignes d’avant le 7 août.”78 
However, convincing the Russians that they would be obliged to completely 
withdraw was everything but an easy task. During the negotiations, the Russian 
representatives even tried to remove the first part of point five, which dictated their 
withdrawal behind the lines of 7 August. At that moment, Sarkozy threatened to walk 
out of the negotiations, and by doing so convinced the Russians that their demands 
were unacceptable.79 Although “Moscow only reluctantly agreed to abolish this 
outer line on the arrival of an EU observer mission in the ‘security zone’”,80 the EU 
successfully deployed its monitors by 1 October 2008 and thus pushed the Russians to 
leave at least Georgia proper.  
Of course, one could argue that the EU monitors are underachievers because 
they cannot fully live up to their mandate without entering South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. But despite today’s shortcomings, their deployment played a key role in 
persuading the Russians to abandon the buffer-zones. By liberating the commercially 
significant main road, ending the occupation of Georgia proper, and thus helping to 
stabilise Georgia politically and economically, the EU had a significant and direct 
impact on the country’s vital interests. Moreover, the EU was the only actor capable 
of doing so: most commentators suggest that if there was any American interest in 
                                                 
76  “Of the six points, only two or let’s say two and a half, perhaps three, have been 
implemented”, Bernard Kouchner said on 6 September 2008. Cited in Asmus, op.cit., p. 
212. 
77 Allison,  op.cit., p. 1158. 
78  Joint Press Conference of Sarkozy and Saakashvili, op.cit. 
79  “Sarkozy got up and said ‘We’re going. This is not negotiable.’” This threat could be 
prevented by Medvedev joining the talks and later giving in on the matter. A. Blomfield, 
“Georgia: French President Nicolas Sarkozy ‘Threatened to Walk out’ of Russia Talks”, The 
Daily Telegraph, 9 September 2008. 
80 Allison,  op.cit., p. 1159. 
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becoming involved in the conflict settlement, this had been impeded by a soon-to-
be ‘lame-duck’ Bush administration, which was worried about undermining John 
McCain’s election campaign and therefore unable to take any political risk.81 
 
4.  Measuring Political Impact: Results and Criticisms 
 
This paper, and the research on which it is based, shows that the EU and its member 
states were heavily involved in the whole process of crisis management. Sixteen 
cases of EFP action have been identified, their outcome has been assessed and 
categorised – eight of them were presented in detail here. Based on a simplified 
version of Roy Ginsberg’s measure of political impact, the analysis found that EFP 
actions had nil impact in six cases, marginal impact in two cases, considerable 
impact in three and significant impact in five cases. Half of EFP actions had 
considerable or significant impact on the two conflicting parties Russia and Georgia. 
The EU successfully affected even their vital interests, and changed their behaviour 
and policies in a number of cases. They are not limited to foreign policy, but also 
include decisions relevant to internal policies such as police reform and economic 
policy. Besides these basic findings, the two following conclusions can be drawn from 
the study. 
First, with only two instances taking place before 2008, the annexed table 
demonstrates that the EU’s engagement is very much limited to the actual war and 
post-war period. Even in spring and early summer 2008 the EU tried to influence the 
course of events in only four instances. While the conflict in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia is almost twenty years old, two-thirds of all cases of EFP action lie within the 
six-month period during and after the war. These findings strongly support the 
argument that the EU had been too passive for too long. The International Crisis 
Group wrote in 2006 that “[t]he EU has shown little willingness to take on direct 
conflict resolution responsibilities”,82 and not much had changed until the situation 
started to heat up in the spring of 2008. Of course, questions such as ‘Could the EU 
have avoided the war by sending an earlier monitoring mission?’ always entail a 
good portion of speculation. Given the EU’s impact during and after the war, it 
seems, however, likely that it would have been able to influence the pre-war period 
more vigorously. 
                                                 
81 Asmus,  op.cit., p. 190. 
82  International Crisis Group, op.cit., p. 27. 
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, it became clear that the EU did have a 
political impact without the use of any kind of coercive means. Obviously, there had 
been no direct military threat. The only step in the direction of military involvement 
was Sarkozy’s statement “L’Europe est disponible” to send a peacekeeping force to 
South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia, an offer never seriously considered at the end.83 But 
even economic measures were not on the European agenda, with the exception of 
the brief suspension of PCA negotiations (case 10). Given its low impact, its short 
duration and the fact that the PCA had yet to come into force, this step can hardly 
be considered a coercive policy.84 The research results made clear that this attempt 
to pressure Russia economically had nil impact. Instead, the EU’s approach during 
the conflict was based fully on soft means such as declarations (case 4), negotiations 
(cases 6, 8, and 11), diplomatic pressure (case 5), the readiness to deploy an 
unarmed monitoring mission (case 11) and international agreements (cases 2 and 
15). Moreover, by convening the Brussels donors’ conference (case 14) and streng-
thening the ENP through the new Eastern Partnership, the EU had considerable 
impact on Georgia by applying some of its pre-war foreign policy tools. 
 
4.1  Criticism I: Is Political Impact an End in Itself? 
 
If it is true that the EU and its member states had such an impressive extent of impact 
on the conflicting parties, it is hard to avoid the question why Europe was neither 
able to prevent the bloodshed, nor to defend Georgia’s territorial integrity. In other 
words, although successfully stopping the battle, the EU was not capable of solving 
the conflict. It is crucial to recall the definition of impact introduced in the first 
chapter: an international actor has political impact if it succeeds in shaping the 
policies or interests of other actors. These policies and interests can be shaped for 
other countries’ benefit or their harm. Thus, our definition of political impact is 
indifferent to political objectives and even to success. This paper has demonstrated 
that an actor’s political impact can even lead to outcomes opposing its initial 
objectives. For example, by half-heartedly committing NATO to a goal 
unacceptable for Russia (case 3), the EU seems to have fuelled the conflict and 
emboldened Russia to act quickly in order to halt Georgia’s NATO accession. 
                                                 
83  Joint Press Conference of Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitri Medvedev, Moscow, 12 August 
2008. 
84  Whether real economic sanctions would have been feasible depends very much on how 
one assesses the distribution of dependency between Russia and the EU and has not 
been discussed here.  
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Equally, some argue that by successfully preventing Saakashvili from terminating the 
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) peacekeeping mandate (case 5) the 
EU weakened the country’s position during the subsequent conflict. Thus, one EU 
official concluded that the EU often had “the wrong kind of impact […] it is impact 
without influence”,85 because it does not live up to its objectives.  
Indeed, the most powerful actor is certainly the one who achieves all its goals, 
but is this also a good indicator for political impact? According to this way of 
reasoning, impact should simply be measured by the extent to which someone 
reaches its political objectives. It is worth putting this argument to the test: in our 
study, Russia would have probably performed best because “[t]hey got control of 
the areas [of South Ossetia and Abkhazia], they got the UN and OSCE out, and they 
got someone who had an eye on the Georgians” [EUMM].86 France also achieved its 
main goals: Saakashvili’s government survived, peace had been achieved and a 
new Cold War had been avoided with EU-Russia relations still on track.87 Russia thus 
had to fight a war in order to reach its goals, while France only needed to calm 
Russia and pressure Georgia. Who had more impact? How can we assess an actor’s 
objectives? Do we take hidden agendas into account? Do countries which aim low 
have more political impact than those with ambitious goals? Such an approach 
seems to raise more questions than it is able to answer. 
It seems reasonable in the first step to leave the notion of political success out 
of the analysis. An unambiguous historical example may help to demonstrate this 
point: during the war in Vietnam (1964-1973), the United States undoubtedly had an 
impact on Vietnam by leading a major war that left a country devastated and an 
estimated 2 million people dead.88 At the same time, the US experienced an 
u n p r e c e d e n t e d  d e f e a t .  O b v i o u s l y ,  t h e  E U ’ s  r e c o r d  i n  G e o r g i a  i s  i n  n o  w a y  
comparable to the Vietnam example, but it demonstrates that political impact and 
political success are not necessarily associated. So the problem remains: does it 
make sense to claim significant or considerable political impact for the EU, if it did 
not even come close to conflict resolution? Political impact without any overall 
success is hard to defend as a meaningful indicator for the EU’s influence in the 
world. Future research will therefore need to introduce the highly elusive concept of 
                                                 
85 Cited  in  Ginsberg,  op.cit., p. 158. 
86  Phone interview with Janne Taalas, op.cit. 
87 Asmus,  op.cit., p. 213. 
88  R. te Heesen, “Vietnam (Zweiter Indochinakrieg)” [Vietnam (Second Indochina War)], 
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‘success’ into the equation. For example, after an analysis similar to that performed 
in this paper (in order to determine the effectiveness of the EU’s impact), political 
success could be assessed in a second step in order to further increase the 
plausibility of the overall argument. 
 
4.2  Criticism II: the Time Factor 
 
The war in Georgia is a relatively recent event. This poses a serious problem to the 
researcher because, when assessing the outcome of EFP actions, one cannot 
consider possible long-term effects of a particular action. For example, it has been 
argued that the donors’ conference organised by the EU had a considerable impact 
on Georgia, because it saved the country from economic and political collapse 
(case 14). However, it is not possible to fully exclude a fall of Saakashvili’s govern-
ment even in the near future, a case in which our argument would be practically 
invalidated. Equally, the EU’s constant call for Russia to reciprocate Georgia’s move 
to more transparency by also concluding memoranda of understanding with EUMM 
(nil impact, case 16) could theoretically trigger some change in Russian policies or 
interests in the future. The time factor is particularly problematic when it comes to 
long-term strategies and projects that may, by definition, unfold their potential only in 
one year or even in ten years. Suppose the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership allow the Georgian administration to slowly but successfully 
prepare for EU membership. In such a case, today’s assessment would be unable to 
correctly evaluate the ENP’s political impact. 
The time factor also points to another challenge that Ginsberg’s framework 
poses to the researcher, namely that some EFP actions might have several outcomes 
or an outcome may be the result of a number of actions. This means that it becomes 
not only difficult to link the different events, but also to categorise them properly. 
Case 8 includes not less than three EFP actions and three outcomes. In the annexed 
table, they are presented in one single column. This is not due to the fact that they 
happened all on the same day, but because they are causally interwoven. Of 
course, the immediate outcome of Sarkozy’s negotiations with Medvedev 
concerning the six-point agreement was Medvedev’s consent to the text. Also, the 
Russian withdrawal that began on 22 August can be considered a direct result of the 
French President’s continued (phone) pressure and his threat to convene an 
extraordinary Council meeting. In accordance with our framework, this would mean 
that the negotiations could only be credited with marginal impact, because they 
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only resulted in a paper (which was not even signed that day), whereas Sarkozy’s 
phone calls would be classified as having had significant impact because they 
directly resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian troops just a couple of days later. 
Such a line of argument is hardly convincing. Of course, without the foregoing 
agreement on the six points, Sarkozy’s phone calls would most likely not have been 
able to trigger a Russian withdrawal, just as the unsigned six-point agreement without 
any further diplomatic pressure might have failed to affect Russia’s military moves. 
When applying the framework, it is therefore important to carefully weigh causes 
and effects and to avoid sticking over-rigidly to the table. Some linkages between 
outputs and outcomes are just not as linear as a one-dimensional row in a table 
might suggest. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper has investigated to what extent and how the EU had a political impact on 
the two conflicting parties during the 2008 war in Georgia. It has become clear that 
in many cases the Union exerted a considerable or significant degree of political 
impact on both conflicting parties. “Leading European countries played the role of a 
mediator in this situation; thus they drew international attention and really influenced 
the settlement of the indirect conflict between the world’s strongest military powers. 
This certainly was a great success for Europe.”89 What is more, it has been shown that 
Europe was able to influence Russia and Georgia significantly even through purely 
non-coercive means. The results challenge conventional thought that the EU cannot 
act as a credible international player unless it builds up more (and first and foremost 
military) capabilities. This is not to say that military and other coercive means are 
unnecessary or should generally not be acquired, but the results suggest that they 
are at least not a precondition for foreign policy to make a difference in world 
politics. The use of a framework that focuses on concrete outcomes rather than on 
abstract capabilities has allowed us to measure EU foreign policy impact in the eyes 
of third parties, i.e. those who experience its impact directly. This constitutes a useful 
approach in order to cope with the EU as a non-traditional type of foreign policy 
actor, one which, on occasion, does not necessarily need the same tools and 
capabilities as traditional nation-states. 
                                                 
89  T. Bordachev, “Military Power in the 21st Century: Russia’s Military Campaign in Georgia: 
Military and Political Implications”, Moscow, Center for Comprehensive European and 
International Studies, 2010 (unpublished). 
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At the same time, the study has also revealed two main shortcomings in 
Ginsberg’s research design. First, a one-dimensional row in our table can sometimes 
insufficiently reproduce the complex web of causes and effects. Particularly in cases 
with several actors and highly interwoven relations amongst them, the accuracy of 
the table concept will decrease. Second, as demonstrated in chapter 4.1, the 
framework is unable to distinguish political impact from political success. It thus risks 
assigning the EU the former even where it has clearly failed to achieve the latter. This 
raises normative questions about the kind of foreign policy the European Union is 
pursuing: is foreign policy impact a goal in and of itself?  
This paper has shown that in half of all cases Europe had a considerable or 
even significant impact on the conflict in Georgia. Yet, is this enough to shape world 
politics? 
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ANNEX: Complete list of EFP actions (the cases discussed in this paper are highlighted) 
 
Case  Object  Date  Input or Issue  Output  Outcome  Political 
Impact 
1  Russia, 
Georgia 
1990s  Stabilisation of South 
Caucasus 
EU and Georgia conclude PCA, focus on 
economic assistance, limited role for EU SR for 
the Southern Caucasus 
Allows Russia to fill the security gap, some 
indirect influence on Georgia’s reform agenda  marginal 
2 Georgia  14  Nov 
2006 
EU to integrate Georgia 
into Western 
community 
ENP Action Plan commits Georgia to peaceful 
conflict resolution and ‘softer’ policies 
Georgia launches new policy initiatives, tries to 
appeal to South Ossetians by ‘soft power’  considerable 






MAP is vetoed by France and Germany, disunity 
leads to an unprecedented formulation in 
summit declaration 
Georgia disappointed not to obtain MAP, Russia 







Symbolic support for 
Georgia 
Five EU foreign ministers visit Georgia  Repeated Russian overflights and Georgian 
frustration about the EU 
nil 
5 Georgia  25  June 
2008 
Georgia unhappy with 
Russian peace-keepers 
EU pressures Georgia not to touch the current 
peacekeeping format 
Georgia gives in and does not unilaterally 




July 2008  EU to prevent Georgia 
to take military action 
‘Steinmeier Plan’ and the promise for another 
meeting in summer in Berlin 
Russia refuses ‘Steinmeier Plan’ and Georgia 
engages militarily 
nil 
7  Russia  11 Aug 
2008 
EU mediation efforts  Sarkozy offers mediation under conditions that 
(1) there is a truce at the moment of his arrival; 
(2) Russia does not take Tbilisi 
Both conditions fulfilled at Sarkozy’s arrival, but 








Saakashvili refuses the 
word ‘status’ 
 
Russian army still 
advances, shootings 
Sarkozy negotiates six-point agreement with 
Medvedev and Saakashvili 
 
Sarkozy calls Medvedev to convince him to 
delete the word ‘status’ 
 
Sarkozy calls Medvedev for compliance, 
threatens to convene European Council 
Medvedev agrees to six-point agreement 
 
 
Medvedev gives in, Saakashvili agrees to six-
point agreement 
 
Russia starts withdrawal from positions on 22 Aug 
(except buffer zones) 
significant Jan Weisensee 
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9 Russia  12  Aug 
2008 
EU supports Georgia’s 
territorial integrity 
Sarkozy defends this point of view at press 
conference in Moscow 
 
 
EU and all its member states strongly condemn 
recognition of 26 Aug 
Term of ‘territorial integrity’ not in six-point 
agreement, Russia recognises Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia on 26 Aug 
 
Russia: recognition irreversible, Treaties on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
nil 
10  Russia  1 Sept 
2008 
Still Russian troops in 
Georgia 
“Until troops have withdrawn to the positions 
held prior to 7 August, meetings on the 
negotiation of the Partnership Agreement will 
be postponed.” 
Russian troops leave Georgia proper, but heavy 
reinforcements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; 
nonetheless, PCA negotiations are resumed 
nil 
11  Russia  8 Sept 
2008 
Russia still occupies 
buffer-zones 
Sarkozy negotiates again in Moscow, threatens 
to walk out of negotiations, offers to deploy 
EUMM to replace Russian troops 
Russia agrees to withdraw from buffer-zones, 
EUMM deployed on 1 Oct 2008  significant 
12  Russia  8 Sept 
2008 
EU wants EUMM to be 
deployed “throughout 
Georgia” 
Clear declarations, but ambiguous agreements 
& EUMM Joint Action 
Russia does not allow EUMM monitors to enter 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia  nil 




Geneva talks  EU pushes for launch of international discussions 
as stipulated by the six-point agreement 
Incident Prevention and Response Mecha-nism 
(IPRM) is most notable result, some progress on 
the ground (at least with Abkhazia) but no 
tangible policy changes 
marginal 
14  Georgia  22 Oct 
2008 
Economic downturn in 
post-war Georgia 
EU and World Bank organise donors’ 
conference and raise € 3.4 billion for 
reconstruction in Georgia 
Georgia economically and politically stabilised, 
Saakashvili government potentially saved from 
collapse 
considerable 
15 Georgia  26  Jan 
2009 
EUMM to increase 
transparency 
Memoranda of understanding on restriction, 
notification and inspection of Georgian armed 
forces 
Georgia complies, new uniforms, limits on 
weapons and new ID for police, restriction of 
movement of armed forces 
significant 
16 Russia  26  Jan 
2009 
EUMM cannot monitor 
South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia 
EUMM calls for Russia to follow Georgia’s “brave 
and unilateral move” to conclude memoranda 




 EU Diplomacy Papers 9/2010 








Karel De Gucht, Shifting EU Foreign Policy into Higher Gear 
 
2/2006 
Günter Burghardt, The European Union’s Transatlantic Relationship 
 
1/2007  
Jorge Sampaio, Global Answers to Global Problems: Health as a Global Public Good 
 
2/2007  
Jean-Victor Louis, The European Union: from External Relations to Foreign Policy? 
 
3/2007  
Sieglinde Gstöhl, Political Dimensions of an Externalization of the EU’s Internal Market 
 
4/2007 
Jan Wouters, The United Nations and the European Union: Partners in Multilateralism 
 
5/2007 




Sahar Arfazadeh Roudsari, Talking Away the Crisis? The E3/EU-Iran Negotiations on Nuclear Issues 
 
1/2008 
Yann Boulay, L’Agence Européenne de Défense : avancée décisive ou désillusion pour une Europe 
de la défense en quête d’efficacité ? 
 
2/2008 
Pier Carlo Padoan, Europe and Global Economic Governance 
 
3/2008 
Sieglinde Gstöhl, A Neighbourhood Economic Community - finalité économique for the ENP? 
 
4/2008 
Davide Bonvicini (ed.), Playing Three-Level Games in the Global Economy – Case Studies from the EU 
 
5/2008 
Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson, Sweden and the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy: A 
Bi-Directional Process of Europeanisation 
 
6/2008 
Anne-Claire Marangoni, Le financement des operations militaires de l’UE : des choix nationaux pour 
une politique européenne de sécurite et de défense ? 
 
7/2008 
Jing Men, EU-China Relations: from Engagement to Marriage? 
 
8/2008 
Giuseppe Balducci, Inside Normative Power Europe: Actors and Processes in the European Promotion 
of Human Rights in China 
 
1/2009 
Monika Tocha, The EU and Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Testing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy 
 Jan Weisensee 
  34 
2/2009 
Quinlan Carthane, A Misleading Promise? Rethinking European Support for Biofuels 
 
3/2009 
Joris Larik, Two Ships in the Night or in the Same Boat Together? Why the European Court of Justice 
Made the Right Choice in the Kadi Case 
 
4/2009 
Alice Serar, Tackling Today's Complex Crises: EU-US Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management 
 
5/2009 




Mathias Dobbels, Serbia and the ICTY: How Effective Is EU Conditionality? 
 
7/2009 




Paul Meerts (ed.), Negotiating with the Russian Bear: Lessons for the EU? 
 
9/2009 
Anne Tiedemann, EU Market Access Teams: New Instruments to Tackle Non-tariff Barriers to Trade 
 
1/2010 
Severin Peters, Strategic Communication for Crisis Management Operations of International 
Organisations: ISAF Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo 
 
2/2010 




Herman Van Rompuy, The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World 
 
4/2010 
Camilla Hansen, Non-Governmental Organisations and the European Union’s Promotion of Human 
Rights in China: NGO Influence or NO Influence?  
 
5/2010 
Egemen Bağış, Turkey's EU Membership Process: Prospects and Challenges 
 
6/2010 
Jan Steinkohl, Normative Power Rivalry? The European Union, Russia and the Question of Kosovo 
 
7/2010 
André Ghione, Pushing the Boundaries: DG Enlargement between Internal and External Environments 
 
8/2010 
Athanasia Kanli, Is the European Union Fighting the War for Children? The EU Policy on the Rights of 
Children Affected by Armed Conflict 
 
9/2010 
Jan Weisensee, Measuring European Foreign Policy Impact: The EU and the Georgia Crisis of 2008 EU Diplomacy Papers 9/2010 
  35 
C Co ol ll le eg ge e   o of f   E Eu ur ro op pe e   S St tu ud di ie es s   
 
Series Editors:  
Govaere I. / Hanf D. / Lannon E. / Mahncke D. /  
 Monar J. / Pelkmans J. 
 




Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed European societies are 
changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation of adaptation. New challenges and new 
requirements arise continually, both internally and externally. The College of Europe Studies series seeks to 
publish research on these issues done at the College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) 
campus. Focused on the European Union and the European integration process, this research may be 
specialised in the areas of political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. 
The objective is to promote understanding of the issues concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing 
discussions. 
 
vol. 12 Men, Jing/Balducci, Giuseppe (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 21st 
Century: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 2010 (262 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-641-2 pb. 
vol. 11 Monar, Jörg (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, 2010 (268 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-615-3 pb. 
vol. 10 Hanf, Dominik/Malacek, Klaus/Muir Elise (dir.), Langues et construction européenne, 2010 (286 p.), ISBN 
978-90-5201-594-1 br. 
vol. 9 Pelkmans, Jacques / Hanf, Dominik / Chang, Michele (eds.), The EU Internal Market in Comparative 
Perspective: Economic, Political and Legal Analyses, 2008 (314 p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-424-1 pb. 
vol. 8 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hans (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, 2008 (315 
p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-422-7 pb. 
vol. 7 Inotai, András, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, 2007 (414 p. ), 
ISBN 978-90-5201-071-7 pb. 
vol. 6 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, 2007 
(232 p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-064-9 pb. 
vol. 5 Hanf, Dominik / Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des lieux et perspectives, 
2007 (329 p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-061-8 pb. 
vol. 4 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the EU's 
Neighbourhood Policy, 2008 (318 p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-047-2 pb. 
vol. 3 Mahncke, Dieter / Monar, Jörg (eds.), International Terrorism: A European Response to a Global Threat?, 
2006 (191p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-046-5 / US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6691-0 pb. 
vol. 2 Demaret, Paul / Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), European Legal Dynamics - Dynamiques juridiques 
européennes, Revised and updated edition of 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe, 
2005 / 2007 (571 p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-067-0 pb. 
vol. 1 Mahncke, Dieter / Ambos, Alicia / Reynolds, Christopher (eds.), European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to 
Reality?, 2004 / second printing 2006 (381 p. ), ISBN 978-90-5201-247-6/ US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6627-9 pb.  
 
 
 Jan Weisensee 
 
  34 